rebump with sec. pathces, ditto bump

Package-Manager: portage-2.1.11.62/cvs/Linux x86_64
Manifest-Sign-Key: 0xB8072B0D

9 files changed, 867 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/ChangeLog b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/ChangeLog
index 05e07b16d8bd..7200c8d25dcc 100644
--- a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/ChangeLog
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,19 @@
 # ChangeLog for app-emulation/xen-pvgrub
 # Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/ChangeLog,v 1.23 2013/02/19 20:20:56 idella4 Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/ChangeLog,v 1.24 2013/05/20 14:15:45 idella4 Exp $
+
+*xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2 (20 May 2013)
+*xen-pvgrub-4.2.2 (20 May 2013)
+
+  20 May 2013; Ian Delaney <idella4@gentoo.org>
+  +files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch,
+  +files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch,
+  +files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch,
+  +files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch,
+  +files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch, +xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2.ebuild,
+  +xen-pvgrub-4.2.2.ebuild, xen-pvgrub-4.2.0-r1.ebuild,
+  xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r1.ebuild:
+  rebump with sec. pathces, ditto bump
 
   19 Feb 2013; Ian Delaney <idella4@gentoo.org> -files/xen-4.2.1-CC.patch,
   files/xen-4.2.1-externals.patch, xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r1.ebuild:
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/Manifest b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/Manifest
index f9bdc86a0426..2e27e971668c 100644
--- a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/Manifest
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/Manifest
@@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ Hash: SHA256
 AUX newlib-implicits.patch 5307 SHA256 34e85aa0380d10271748cdc6cb0ff3f502fe5c3113724ba8a2c2f69668970c46 SHA512 582cfa36dbb44e8abc83120d44af78a7a7cd3f7a009c65858f3d68276bf5f772b18c4692b7e68202f9ec246e29c785fa111b19bcaefc2f04f429f1b69e77d48f WHIRLPOOL 0d36e2f4ac6476522a05842ab1194e6c58d4fa6a03ae53b14b839aa4057ce55fdd6ec5fa47d28ddcaea22fed153ca60f50413cc77f9a4ded2397168395bf336b
 AUX xen-4-CVE-2012-4544-XSA-25.patch 12691 SHA256 2bbac6a09946722fc082124870d750a6b9ab93ea3166bf50faee717acf03d70b SHA512 e911636808ecb08510821bf18ba7807485f2b4b7288966349d40cb4091eeafbc5d9abbee5bc26f04dfe5f3157e9173d1820d1e3b2b25d1e678358ad8d5b2f901 WHIRLPOOL 48e08d9900536a65193290dd4e802a64c33033414ef55823ef21806905ba448bd4c57af4102752172035c0572c431f280f84cf362007911cb1ba2573d4379749
 AUX xen-4-CVE-2012-6075-XSA-41.patch 1393 SHA256 6aa21c02e94cb9b4f612c7a9d1a8f980967692b1f20346da9670abb1d7ec688c SHA512 547f63e7eaf0a6db1a9de267cc6f9aa0f28e2221f2c69ca463ada85edbc07ac84c276dcd3ee017ab8846d4e4129e182fb76be35b91ae9a0e0afecdc091e0c305 WHIRLPOOL 848359780edc15895a09bf76afeaa503f907ac98a856b52d64ef4dcb137e2319222a47cd7a2866e6f25731498f487cfca2a462fb6dfcda8404026d8acfff5bcc
+AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch 2515 SHA256 7d7a5746bc76da747bf61eb87b3303a8f3abb0d96561f35a706c671317ebe4eb SHA512 2abe25c83a3ede047db380b0477ba1aaaf9d955e87244f8d2404699e011cac46ad5501a0f75b76b90b5dc276d19ae08600a2fe57a69681f97088b5d17d977066 WHIRLPOOL 5176ba1c9f3019c50c087c56185c393ae99c0504f10abf08d896998f80d9f0a05c8c103b4276c3370c72171fab2fdc07ba9c68261ac02c6a859ed7a74b6bd056
+AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch 9844 SHA256 822da2303f1fc69648d7a29eb72fdda8e64baab3edc0e1548456d31e66ed1d7c SHA512 35ed4d580d219e977ee1085c223563f51ccd9ce3675df2660d10d99c366a2fe2446269c98ac9dbf57c37de83340f4b0868d0eb3c5d898be4c0fc80357f6ed780 WHIRLPOOL 36015584e3f72c3eea62cd0658230805645983be571768f068baa605b274d16cca9fc4dcb27152016dde81f6a1dbcd91430654af5c2c1b5211ed5c2441b65c1c
+AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch 3846 SHA256 dc23077028584e71a08dd0dc9e81552c76744a5ce9d39df5958a95ae9cf3107b SHA512 31dd8c62d41cc0a01a79d9b24a5b793f5e2058230808d9c5364c6ff3477ab02f3258f1bbd761d97dc1b97ee120b41524b999eaac77f33b606496fc324b5fa2e4 WHIRLPOOL 6913705b070daeac8925a44585f94f78ec43cf1d7a8feeba6839499b0340a727f3c39848627bcd58217b589a932fbfce13628bdca2b815e2ddf58b9c69c11721
+AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch 1877 SHA256 37055cbc74111cbc507af3f09d6ac2e472f24efd54cd3e08583dc635e66a539f SHA512 1e3ef057744076b9fca22c1982f33d38be06ab8e5d57e40e3160fc2850b69711a1765e4a2b037f7bc1fdb8a9f93f1649d86ea3da972ec4af147b7b80191069f8 WHIRLPOOL 43e78ad3ba597e7084b6194507839b8cc4c21f45c8fd70f00cb061a4ad22ec9ec690bf35ffffc7e02c616de5f35b329c6c4e3a9cf5ddaf23cdf0525681f70639
+AUX xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch 1597 SHA256 f7daee05c81bfa4effa821e22c8b0861c254b3a1d4e14b7da5709a6102997b87 SHA512 f4d49b90b08b5ac52a5e41f0b555db20e846016f0020e67ea243eed24f621b4b356c3c9e7c181e97fa2d428024a941b7b52eb5bfd933a850aafc4a7b51bb3295 WHIRLPOOL e0fb3d0d9463276dc6331547ef13d4117d7c3bb1503f9e60885553056a3452cba4937500834dedc79fde29198420bf0c7e5c7e9e596c8d27202559dd00c94bb7
 AUX xen-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch 9551 SHA256 93c8726fc3e0bd3f54d4162a3fdace45e3c3ea24fecf5f54270c6dc55c3924ab SHA512 64bfc2dd60bf5a7db593250f9da62cdea4daa458aa8c474ec47b065f6e19509555f48d49ec8624c484d873fe947b6f9cab98cdcd2c24ca8795eb1b64b378a004 WHIRLPOOL 341506ced55ae2ad30af1696434df25ba77c665042aa82dda35d0722f0cccbe567c8cebf51c2e20e0df3084f74f7eb7a69808dea2801f911b2d3c46a293b6ba2
 AUX xen-4.2.0-externals.patch 4283 SHA256 6666c647d55a9d020be5ecad5ffc17bd3e739ef0d6a570457e6960fa0b0a0b4d SHA512 906ca695204a6c89d700c4a1cbc63faf614b8c2afd6e2a98f7b4f49a5ed2b1ccdeb64a9613f3e80e10ea3ddd8b7233c5a4e58e25edc2b5918bb230dac4f741d9 WHIRLPOOL 0c5ff52dd7c69d7f9f841b15b543374a22486f7369ed41b43bd0b86003d6a90c9434ff9e7af95923a68b17142036a1fe5d9dc0b5e2057aeb62f7fd8b89dfea8f
 AUX xen-4.2.0-jserver.patch 1487 SHA256 3bbf6d06ad1960e30dc84a3e3b179d5d23331ecf60d347871b7008c58456a6ed SHA512 f92bced9f3e7fec84b1bfce6ce3366f134cec2b892ffc3afcdd3fd3f73daf158c17c312260fae39bc9e04c1dab1045d17f0da706dd0dba0279e66dea454aed8d WHIRLPOOL 10828eb65effad714a61a18bcd6c33c2b7fb7fd0007b1a68aed7a653cd7e67acc04cc5eb9574d7d50c92fc7ca8223dff0c73f1cfde994e4ee1d787f536588b99
@@ -14,16 +19,19 @@ DIST newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz 12024353 SHA256 db426394965c48c1d29023e1cc6d965ea6b9a9
 DIST pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2 212265 SHA256 f60ae61cfbd5da1d849d0beaa21f593c38dac9359f0b3ddc612f447408265b24 SHA512 2b3d98d027e46d8c08037366dde6f0781ca03c610ef2b380984639e4ef39899ed8d8b8e4cd9c9dc54df101279b95879bd66bfd4d04ad07fef41e847ea7ae32b5 WHIRLPOOL ce801947fcf7ba0b56710029f25e746d3e03a80699af9d3570efcd417b12b546264f286b2e78b1402cca766c08e35bdd0ff0a692ab4ad419295f00bcfe91130e
 DIST xen-4.2.0.tar.gz 15587687 SHA256 43f4a086e4e0330145a27b7ace8365c42b5afbc95cefadafe067be91bd3e5cfb SHA512 4fb56c79d722fb307bc657f16d02079c6636427e7650c4354193632d38d2d1db8e588f844ff0ca6e757c108ed639a528565ec9fc7c00bb4d5b6fbc9d122d8a70 WHIRLPOOL 369a109375864cb61920b56cf501522051d28513e738f0fd0e7b76244c3e08a8a0a6ff6cf245872d9bbd9c0f22c7da76c9cbc0f852bad6108ca25fd42dc677c0
 DIST xen-4.2.1.tar.gz 15593695 SHA256 fb8df5827ce3e2d2d3b078d9e5afde502beb5e7ab9442e51a94087061bd450c6 SHA512 fe27a965e2b34035bd025482eda9fc4d4e82523c929323fd30813367d5ffbe2fa1ed3d7d4479f2632e8b5625972448b7bd6a7768e8dc1dcd1b6747d281cc1a9e WHIRLPOOL 226bbed059541e804f1a44e721023ffbc04bae43000653b1d7d6a9bfec0d9efbf7a48b1b0a7ad3fcb8e34f8b91e1c620c2a8eddf97baad487e9db37d49a58f37
+DIST xen-4.2.2.tar.gz 15602746 SHA256 c9bfe91a5e72f8545acebad9889d64368020359bfe18044c0e683133e55ae005 SHA512 4943b18016ed8c2b194a3b55e6655b3b734b39ffb8cb7ee0a0580f2f4460a1d0e92e1de8ac23f5186272914fad1650586af51fd7c3644d0310eb16f2e11c5e80 WHIRLPOOL 519eb87cb2da694696cbc3e72070a0a3bdb07c46fa266d855d8379eec3a92adfa4d434af3ac01c37834ce4a9174081a6c40030b185a70902329b185cb8d0bbea
 DIST zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz 496597 SHA256 1795c7d067a43174113fdf03447532f373e1c6c57c08d61d9e4e9be5e244b05e SHA512 021b958fcd0d346c4ba761bcf0cc40f3522de6186cf5a0a6ea34a70504ce9622b1c2626fce40675bc8282cf5f5ade18473656abc38050f72f5d6480507a2106e WHIRLPOOL 8fd7010faf6a48a9c7ff4bcfe3ce4fe9061eb541259e0a2d0def214e8c4becf2b22e8d6f96f65ca827abffeaa9d96e95ed2402844f99835f7b079fc9f3e84276
 EBUILD xen-pvgrub-4.2.0-r1.ebuild 4475 SHA256 fceb4fa420c5ec25efb54c986c89c183b663f633a1ac3d1ed697503947524cb0 SHA512 953e3d435f03b4bc84a65c5a5abced627786d879b04e4dd70bfbe55d2e85d52d56f1ed24ede8b6e4fb9700b337e691d63a93fd0a70df6866888a8259dcfe9903 WHIRLPOOL 473239d1e09c24a6cc33a64c55917cbbe4c25e57dbe30e97bb2c9ccefaf8ff77dc7af61097527f7c8b608ddf33e13c26e990d3f2b0e40882dde3964342f7431a
 EBUILD xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r1.ebuild 4284 SHA256 828aa5f490ff327d4ec7f980fb332718896ec3a29fe8b404a76a47f2f3a74c59 SHA512 85928afef0dc195519794363a1cba95c813372cc87901cbf37dfd08a92d1e3b370c6a224975a4b2ac6a7afbd8a7888400fbbca84b6aa171256a1d28fa597a0b0 WHIRLPOOL 4d9bc9d2879bc5a06df65f143753a520084307fc943e3d3a647b4d0c64fc92d141ab17131c21a571f4fa32e11ebe35e44cff436f012b2fd7d85dcd9ac22142c6
+EBUILD xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2.ebuild 4544 SHA256 b01606d665086adb4c9f692dbb5fbbaf4949d758241098cbfe4ce415254a34ba SHA512 b0c860ce244ee72d38437a43c46e7cd66422437d146121a09aa8a7a1aad0e4c331a2c459cfbf253a1b5343179d2353fd1763eb91b81e3aecd63a735ad00a16e4 WHIRLPOOL a01d4f16b6ade5a5c6fa3d23ef3b5048d494b167d48e654cbb61a5d3d966d718d60170488fb8ef4c4b87d807cfbb4608e5791ab58855f08b6b556adb9188a3ed
 EBUILD xen-pvgrub-4.2.1.ebuild 3676 SHA256 acd0892c712e9d0029d9ed6084fdfe872e44bc55b45a9de731cc88e56c7d5d05 SHA512 fa91836feb63768e8d1870874a3fb0445e5483ef708582003f7b13ac8315a1134425ddfb8be10565a779f0360cc95b670a86a6043fee4144846ab9548cc9a4dd WHIRLPOOL 349dbc28d6739e9820e3c42d6013acf1498a17c80e47477851ab5eca8320dae7fb78e4939c7ccc5e89a410c3fbe98684163b04c0ea144f7d796c46adcb67e6ac
-MISC ChangeLog 5616 SHA256 d1a002e6385015f32f5716e61a81d72272c60b8c7b3236a8fca1c79072a4e2b8 SHA512 697899b54924e4bdb38ebe958d47dcc819f2d385a31c46548f89497cb75a03a10bb9e12650bc78996d64b9e21368f0b1e3fbcf6c4fe8a6ec5eb5e66e75406338 WHIRLPOOL 8ad498d5b4d6405d1636491cf2f298623dd2b9508dc1a181670a003a3e2165f964d73d7e9bc4217b3a91899f2f38e3d5f302dabe5f90304d72428f1c905b375b
+EBUILD xen-pvgrub-4.2.2.ebuild 4390 SHA256 a8d90e9d7fe36308a76cb0e08d1da40b809b74572343c5150a79e1b8a70751dd SHA512 8fedd4dc35053018d6aad91f4042299cfd9f0bd0cdd1f0c6c85e76114878e9134cc00fabc58c5807c911b85dc69374dd47896d97a1e9d1bd91b434bfbca64b6d WHIRLPOOL d1e3f4227aebdf47f399a9d130c663c962dc8bcde151394803a767508aed77bb25939592fbae57ecaae435b8811cb2f9f6be0c7e7a40d2f6e3c4de1a8f741032
+MISC ChangeLog 6102 SHA256 18cc24c3d7ef58ce041b2c03b0b71165278f5b8e0193cc501556256073edf814 SHA512 10bfb0ddf40dd211ea1e5d5d6da89fed0404fca85682b4b39d78e2017d83052696ce7e8f78624e2bf66efc235dcfc58dc9e5c2861b1e45d036ede7e6ad7fad7b WHIRLPOOL 15efd7bb02642083db189b9b44343800bd762e3157560d9750c4159b53ed6c1d2c55fd22cf7dd3c4c47e029b37277ce3bdd29d555cc724c1dd5b17f0c0eadb9e
 MISC metadata.xml 156 SHA256 4a030777459245372bda9f7925f3a5ed3ef2b29b77e1a2971f3400ac2059b1e2 SHA512 66b610ce3a3c525f52ad132e0c6cab329866069d8f40cbfc7302b12f8fc1217705ce9d5aab9c08ee3f7eb86bd880b5c3595b10c3eb67932148a109ec11b88c22 WHIRLPOOL e7f151fa553d737c02f8791448170ddd88b9330b1b01a868cd5c32a875b58b36dd1e2b041308f657d35550f22e5798cd96037c3c890c0646119046f984505c23
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-+gIAoJDOZUi1YaWOwzR7n8Nrscz/9MN/
-=aEBg
+iEYEAREIAAYFAlGaMCMACgkQso7CE7gHKw3b/ACcC8I3ljJ3bcZAnqgQBkmeFKgK
+rbUAoNgiqbWI3R5IiVgTn8NvcX8GBfy3
+=tU14
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diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f4a5dc0881e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
+index 3558889..d4d1c7b 100644
+--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
++++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/partial.ml
+@@ -27,8 +27,15 @@ external header_size: unit -> int = "stub_header_size"
+ external header_of_string_internal: string -> int * int * int * int
+          = "stub_header_of_string"
+ 
++let xenstore_payload_max = 4096 (* xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h *)
++
+ let of_string s =
+ 	let tid, rid, opint, dlen = header_of_string_internal s in
++	(* A packet which is bigger than xenstore_payload_max is illegal.
++	   This will leave the guest connection is a bad state and will
++	   be hard to recover from without restarting the connection
++	   (ie rebooting the guest) *)
++	let dlen = min xenstore_payload_max dlen in
+ 	{
+ 		tid = tid;
+ 		rid = rid;
+@@ -38,6 +45,7 @@ let of_string s =
+ 	}
+ 
+ let append pkt s sz =
++	if pkt.len > 4096 then failwith "Buffer.add: cannot grow buffer";
+ 	Buffer.add_string pkt.buf (String.sub s 0 sz)
+ 
+ let to_complete pkt =
+diff --git a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c
+index 00414c5..4888ac5 100644
+--- a/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c
++++ b/tools/ocaml/libs/xb/xs_ring_stubs.c
+@@ -39,21 +39,23 @@ static int xs_ring_read(struct mmap_interface *interface,
+                              char *buffer, int len)
+ {
+ 	struct xenstore_domain_interface *intf = interface->addr;
+-	XENSTORE_RING_IDX cons, prod;
++	XENSTORE_RING_IDX cons, prod; /* offsets only */
+ 	int to_read;
+ 
+-	cons = intf->req_cons;
+-	prod = intf->req_prod;
++	cons = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->req_cons;
++	prod = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->req_prod;
+ 	xen_mb();
++	cons = MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons);
++	prod = MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod);
+ 	if (prod == cons)
+ 		return 0;
+-	if (MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(prod) > MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons)) 
++	if (prod > cons)
+ 		to_read = prod - cons;
+ 	else
+-		to_read = XENSTORE_RING_SIZE - MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons);
++		to_read = XENSTORE_RING_SIZE - cons;
+ 	if (to_read < len)
+ 		len = to_read;
+-	memcpy(buffer, intf->req + MASK_XENSTORE_IDX(cons), len);
++	memcpy(buffer, intf->req + cons, len);
+ 	xen_mb();
+ 	intf->req_cons += len;
+ 	return len;
+@@ -66,8 +68,8 @@ static int xs_ring_write(struct mmap_interface *interface,
+ 	XENSTORE_RING_IDX cons, prod;
+ 	int can_write;
+ 
+-	cons = intf->rsp_cons;
+-	prod = intf->rsp_prod;
++	cons = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->rsp_cons;
++	prod = *(volatile uint32*)&intf->rsp_prod;
+ 	xen_mb();
+ 	if ( (prod - cons) >= XENSTORE_RING_SIZE )
+ 		return 0;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9448ea9c6748
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+x86: fix various issues with handling guest IRQs
+
+- properly revoke IRQ access in map_domain_pirq() error path
+- don't permit replacing an in use IRQ
+- don't accept inputs in the GSI range for MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI
+- track IRQ access permission in host IRQ terms, not guest IRQ ones
+  (and with that, also disallow Dom0 access to IRQ0)
+
+This is CVE-2013-1919 / XSA-46.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
+
+--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+@@ -968,14 +968,16 @@ static void domcreate_launch_dm(libxl__e
+     }
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < d_config->b_info.num_irqs; i++) {
+-        uint32_t irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
++        int irq = d_config->b_info.irqs[i];
+ 
+-        LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %"PRIx32, domid, irq);
++        LOG(DEBUG, "dom%d irq %d", domid, irq);
+ 
+-        ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
++        ret = irq >= 0 ? xc_physdev_map_pirq(CTX->xch, domid, irq, &irq)
++                       : -EOVERFLOW;
++        if (!ret)
++            ret = xc_domain_irq_permission(CTX->xch, domid, irq, 1);
+         if ( ret<0 ){
+-            LOGE(ERROR,
+-                 "failed give dom%d access to irq %"PRId32, domid, irq);
++            LOGE(ERROR, "failed give dom%d access to irq %d", domid, irq);
+             ret = ERROR_FAIL;
+         }
+     }
+--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
++++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/server/irqif.py
+@@ -73,6 +73,12 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
+        
+         pirq = get_param('irq')
+ 
++        rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
++                                 index = pirq,
++                                 pirq  = pirq)
++        if rc < 0:
++            raise VmError('irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
++
+         rc = xc.domain_irq_permission(domid        = self.getDomid(),
+                                       pirq         = pirq,
+                                       allow_access = True)
+@@ -81,12 +87,6 @@ class IRQController(DevController):
+             #todo non-fatal
+             raise VmError(
+                 'irq: Failed to configure irq: %d' % (pirq))
+-        rc = xc.physdev_map_pirq(domid = self.getDomid(),
+-                                index = pirq,
+-                                pirq  = pirq)
+-        if rc < 0:
+-            raise VmError(
+-                'irq: Failed to map irq %x' % (pirq))
+         back = dict([(k, config[k]) for k in self.valid_cfg if k in config])
+         return (self.allocateDeviceID(), back, {})
+ 
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+@@ -1219,7 +1219,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
+     /* DOM0 is permitted full I/O capabilities. */
+     rc |= ioports_permit_access(dom0, 0, 0xFFFF);
+     rc |= iomem_permit_access(dom0, 0UL, ~0UL);
+-    rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, d->nr_pirqs - 1);
++    rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
+ 
+     /*
+      * Modify I/O port access permissions.
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+@@ -772,9 +772,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+             goto bind_out;
+ 
+         ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
+-             !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
+-            goto bind_out;
++        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
++        {
++            int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
++
++            if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
++                goto bind_out;
++        }
+ 
+         ret = -ESRCH;
+         if ( iommu_enabled )
+@@ -803,9 +807,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
+         bind = &(domctl->u.bind_pt_irq);
+ 
+         ret = -EPERM;
+-        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
+-             !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, bind->machine_irq) )
+-            goto unbind_out;
++        if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
++        {
++            int irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(d, bind->machine_irq);
++
++            if ( irq <= 0 || !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
++                goto unbind_out;
++        }
+ 
+         if ( iommu_enabled )
+         {
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
+@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ int create_irq(int node)
+         desc->arch.used = IRQ_UNUSED;
+         irq = ret;
+     }
++    else if ( dom0 )
++    {
++        ret = irq_permit_access(dom0, irq);
++        if ( ret )
++            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++                   "Could not grant Dom0 access to IRQ%d (error %d)\n",
++                   irq, ret);
++    }
+ 
+     return irq;
+ }
+@@ -280,6 +288,17 @@ void clear_irq_vector(int irq)
+ void destroy_irq(unsigned int irq)
+ {
+     BUG_ON(!MSI_IRQ(irq));
++
++    if ( dom0 )
++    {
++        int err = irq_deny_access(dom0, irq);
++
++        if ( err )
++            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++                   "Could not revoke Dom0 access to IRQ%u (error %d)\n",
++                   irq, err);
++    }
++
+     dynamic_irq_cleanup(irq);
+     clear_irq_vector(irq);
+ }
+@@ -1858,7 +1877,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ 
+     if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) &&
+          !(IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) &&
+-           irq_access_permitted(current->domain, pirq)))
++           irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq)))
+         return -EPERM;
+ 
+     if ( pirq < 0 || pirq >= d->nr_pirqs || irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
+@@ -1887,17 +1906,18 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+         return ret;
+     }
+ 
+-    ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
++    ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+     if ( ret )
+     {
+-        dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not permit access to irq %d\n",
+-                d->domain_id, pirq);
++        printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++               "dom%d: could not permit access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
++               d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+         return ret;
+     }
+ 
+     ret = prepare_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, pirq, &info);
+     if ( ret )
+-        return ret;
++        goto revoke;
+ 
+     desc = irq_to_desc(irq);
+ 
+@@ -1921,8 +1941,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+         spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock, flags);
+ 
+         if ( desc->handler != &no_irq_type )
++        {
++            spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
+             dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: irq %d in use\n",
+                     d->domain_id, irq);
++            pci_disable_msi(msi_desc);
++            ret = -EBUSY;
++            goto done;
++        }
+         setup_msi_handler(desc, msi_desc);
+ 
+         if ( opt_irq_vector_map == OPT_IRQ_VECTOR_MAP_PERDEV
+@@ -1951,7 +1977,14 @@ int map_domain_pirq(
+ 
+ done:
+     if ( ret )
++    {
+         cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
++ revoke:
++        if ( irq_deny_access(d, irq) )
++            printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++                   "dom%d: could not revoke access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
++                   d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
++    }
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2017,10 +2050,11 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d, 
+     if ( !forced_unbind )
+         cleanup_domain_irq_pirq(d, irq, info);
+ 
+-    ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
++    ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+     if ( ret )
+-        dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: could not deny access to irq %d\n",
+-                d->domain_id, pirq);
++        printk(XENLOG_G_ERR
++               "dom%d: could not deny access to IRQ%d (pirq %d)\n",
++               d->domain_id, irq, pirq);
+ 
+  done:
+     return ret;
+--- a/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
++++ b/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c
+@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int physdev_map_pirq(domid_t domid, int 
+         if ( irq == -1 )
+             irq = create_irq(NUMA_NO_NODE);
+ 
+-        if ( irq < 0 || irq >= nr_irqs )
++        if ( irq < nr_irqs_gsi || irq >= nr_irqs )
+         {
+             dprintk(XENLOG_G_ERR, "dom%d: can't create irq for msi!\n",
+                     d->domain_id);
+--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
++++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <xen/paging.h>
+ #include <xen/hypercall.h>
+ #include <asm/current.h>
++#include <asm/irq.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <public/domctl.h>
+ #include <xsm/xsm.h>
+@@ -897,9 +898,9 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domc
+         else if ( xsm_irq_permission(d, pirq, allow) )
+             ret = -EPERM;
+         else if ( allow )
+-            ret = irq_permit_access(d, pirq);
++            ret = pirq_permit_access(d, pirq);
+         else
+-            ret = irq_deny_access(d, pirq);
++            ret = pirq_deny_access(d, pirq);
+ 
+         rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+     }
+--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c
++++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c
+@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static long evtchn_bind_pirq(evtchn_bind
+     if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= d->nr_pirqs) )
+         return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-    if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !irq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
++    if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) && !pirq_access_permitted(d, pirq) )
+         return -EPERM;
+ 
+     spin_lock(&d->event_lock);
+--- a/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
++++ b/xen/include/xen/iocap.h
+@@ -28,4 +28,22 @@
+ #define irq_access_permitted(d, i)                      \
+     rangeset_contains_singleton((d)->irq_caps, i)
+ 
++#define pirq_permit_access(d, i) ({                     \
++    struct domain *d__ = (d);                           \
++    int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i);               \
++    i__ > 0 ? rangeset_add_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
++            : -EINVAL;                                  \
++})
++#define pirq_deny_access(d, i) ({                       \
++    struct domain *d__ = (d);                           \
++    int i__ = domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i);               \
++    i__ > 0 ? rangeset_remove_singleton(d__->irq_caps, i__)\
++            : -EINVAL;                                  \
++})
++#define pirq_access_permitted(d, i) ({                  \
++    struct domain *d__ = (d);                           \
++    rangeset_contains_singleton(d__->irq_caps,          \
++                                domain_pirq_to_irq(d__, i));\
++})
++
+ #endif /* __XEN_IOCAP_H__ */
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..998dbcb1d516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+Add -f FMT  / --format FMT arg to qemu-nbd
+
+From: "Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>
+
+Currently the qemu-nbd program will auto-detect the format of
+any disk it is given. This behaviour is known to be insecure.
+For example, if qemu-nbd initially exposes a 'raw' file to an
+unprivileged app, and that app runs
+
+   'qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o backing_file=/etc/shadow /dev/nbd0'
+
+then the next time the app is started, the qemu-nbd will now
+detect it as a 'qcow2' file and expose /etc/shadow to the
+unprivileged app.
+
+The only way to avoid this is to explicitly tell qemu-nbd what
+disk format to use on the command line, completely disabling
+auto-detection. This patch adds a '-f' / '--format' arg for
+this purpose, mirroring what is already available via qemu-img
+and qemu commands.
+
+  qemu-nbd --format raw -p 9000 evil.img
+
+will now always use raw, regardless of what format 'evil.img'
+looks like it contains
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
+[Use errx, not err. - Paolo]
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
+
+[ This is a security issue, CVE-2013-1922 / XSA-48. ]
+
+diff --git a/qemu-nbd.c b/qemu-nbd.c
+index 291cba2..8fbe2cf 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.c
+@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ out:
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+     BlockDriverState *bs;
++    BlockDriver *drv;
+     off_t dev_offset = 0;
+     off_t offset = 0;
+     uint32_t nbdflags = 0;
+@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+     struct sockaddr_in addr;
+     socklen_t addr_len = sizeof(addr);
+     off_t fd_size;
+-    const char *sopt = "hVb:o:p:rsnP:c:dvk:e:t";
++    const char *sopt = "hVb:o:p:rsnP:c:dvk:e:f:t";
+     struct option lopt[] = {
+         { "help", 0, NULL, 'h' },
+         { "version", 0, NULL, 'V' },
+@@ -271,6 +272,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+         { "snapshot", 0, NULL, 's' },
+         { "nocache", 0, NULL, 'n' },
+         { "shared", 1, NULL, 'e' },
++        { "format", 1, NULL, 'f' },
+         { "persistent", 0, NULL, 't' },
+         { "verbose", 0, NULL, 'v' },
+         { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
+@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+     int max_fd;
+     int persistent = 0;
+     pthread_t client_thread;
++    const char *fmt = NULL;
+ 
+     /* The client thread uses SIGTERM to interrupt the server.  A signal
+      * handler ensures that "qemu-nbd -v -c" exits with a nice status code.
+@@ -368,6 +371,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+                 errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Shared device number must be greater than 0\n");
+             }
+             break;
++        case 'f':
++            fmt = optarg;
++            break;
+ 	case 't':
+ 	    persistent = 1;
+ 	    break;
+@@ -478,9 +484,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+     bdrv_init();
+     atexit(bdrv_close_all);
+ 
++    if (fmt) {
++        drv = bdrv_find_format(fmt);
++        if (!drv) {
++            errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unknown file format '%s'", fmt);
++        }
++    } else {
++        drv = NULL;
++    }
++
+     bs = bdrv_new("hda");
+     srcpath = argv[optind];
+-    if ((ret = bdrv_open(bs, srcpath, flags, NULL)) < 0) {
++    ret = bdrv_open(bs, srcpath, flags, drv);
++    if (ret < 0) {
+         errno = -ret;
+         err(EXIT_FAILURE, "Failed to bdrv_open '%s'", argv[optind]);
+     }
+diff --git a/qemu-nbd.texi b/qemu-nbd.texi
+index 44996cc..f56c68e 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.texi
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen/qemu-nbd.texi
+@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ Export Qemu disk image using NBD protocol.
+   disconnect the specified device
+ @item -e, --shared=@var{num}
+   device can be shared by @var{num} clients (default @samp{1})
++@item -f, --format=@var{fmt}
++  force block driver for format @var{fmt} instead of auto-detecting
+ @item -t, --persistent
+   don't exit on the last connection
+ @item -v, --verbose
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4b92c7f98d35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+VT-d: don't permit SVT_NO_VERIFY entries for known device types
+
+Only in cases where we don't know what to do we should leave the IRTE
+blank (suppressing all validation), but we should always log a warning
+in those cases (as being insecure).
+
+This is CVE-2013-1952 / XSA-49.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
+Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
+
+--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+@@ -440,16 +440,15 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
+     type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
+     switch ( type )
+     {
++    case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
+     case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
+     case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
+-    case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
+-        break;
+-
+-    case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
+         set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
+         break;
+ 
+     case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
++    case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
++    /* case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE: */
+         ret = find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus);
+         if ( ret == 0 ) /* integrated PCI device */
+         {
+@@ -461,10 +460,15 @@ static void set_msi_source_id(struct pci
+             if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
+                 set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
+                             (bus << 8) | pdev->bus);
+-            else if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE )
++            else
+                 set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16,
+                             PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
+         }
++        else
++            dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
++                    "d%d: no upstream bridge for %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
++                    pdev->domain->domain_id,
++                    seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
+         break;
+ 
+     default:
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4543f21bc460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+diff -ur xen-4.2.1.orig/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c xen-4.2.1/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c
+--- xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c	2012-12-17 23:01:55.000000000 +0800
++++ xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/intremap.c	2013-05-15 23:09:06.704546506 +0800
+@@ -440,16 +440,17 @@
+     type = pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn);
+     switch ( type )
+     {
++    case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
+     case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_BRIDGE:
+     case DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE:
+-    case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
+-        break;
+ 
+-    case DEV_TYPE_PCIe_ENDPOINT:
+         set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ, SQ_ALL_16, PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
+         break;
+ 
+     case DEV_TYPE_PCI:
++    case DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE:
++    /* case DEV_TYPE_PCI2PCIe_BRIDGE: */
++
+         ret = find_upstream_bridge(seg, &bus, &devfn, &secbus);
+         if ( ret == 0 ) /* integrated PCI device */
+         {
+@@ -461,10 +462,15 @@
+             if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_PCIe2PCI_BRIDGE )
+                 set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
+                             (bus << 8) | pdev->bus);
+-            else if ( pdev_type(seg, bus, devfn) == DEV_TYPE_LEGACY_PCI_BRIDGE )
++            else
+                 set_ire_sid(ire, SVT_VERIFY_BUS, SQ_ALL_16,
+                             PCI_BDF2(bus, devfn));
+         }
++        else
++            dprintk(XENLOG_WARNING VTDPREFIX,
++                    "d%d: no upstream bridge for %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
++                    pdev->domain->domain_id,
++                    seg, bus, PCI_SLOT(devfn), PCI_FUNC(devfn));
+         break;
+ 
+     default:
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0447dd542a15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.1-r2.ebuild,v 1.1 2013/05/20 14:15:45 idella4 Exp $
+
+EAPI=4
+PYTHON_DEPEND="2:2.6"
+
+inherit flag-o-matic eutils multilib python toolchain-funcs
+
+XEN_EXTFILES_URL="http://xenbits.xensource.com/xen-extfiles"
+LIBPCI_URL=ftp://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/pub/linux/pci
+GRUB_URL=mirror://gnu-alpha/grub
+SRC_URI="
+		http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
+		$GRUB_URL/grub-0.97.tar.gz
+		$XEN_EXTFILES_URL/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
+		$LIBPCI_URL/pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
+		$XEN_EXTFILES_URL/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
+		$XEN_EXTFILES_URL/newlib/newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz"
+
+S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
+
+DESCRIPTION="allows to boot Xen domU kernels from a menu.lst laying inside guest filesystem"
+HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
+LICENSE="GPL-2"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
+IUSE="custom-cflags"
+
+DEPEND="sys-devel/gettext"
+
+RDEPEND=">=app-emulation/xen-4.2.1"
+
+pkg_setup() {
+	python_set_active_version 2
+	python_pkg_setup
+}
+
+retar-externals() {
+	# Purely to unclutter src_prepare
+	local set="grub-0.97.tar.gz lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz"
+
+	# epatch can't patch in $WORKDIR, requires a sed; Bug #455194. Patchable, but sed informative
+	sed -e s':AR=${AR-"ar rc"}:AR=${AR-"ar"}:' \
+		-i "${WORKDIR}"/zlib-1.2.3/configure
+	sed -e 's:^AR=ar rc:AR=ar:' \
+		-e s':$(AR) $@:$(AR) rc $@:' \
+		-i "${WORKDIR}"/zlib-1.2.3/{Makefile,Makefile.in}
+	einfo "zlib Makefile edited"
+
+	cd "${WORKDIR}"
+	tar czp zlib-1.2.3 -f zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
+	tar czp grub-0.97 -f grub-0.97.tar.gz
+	tar czp lwip -f lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
+	tar czp newlib-1.16.0 -f newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz
+	mv $set "${S}"/stubdom/
+	einfo "tarballs moved to source"
+}
+
+src_prepare() {
+	# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
+	if use custom-cflags; then
+		einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
+		# try and remove all the default custom-cflags
+		find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-i {} \;
+	fi
+
+	# Patch the unmergeable newlib, fix most of the leftover gcc QA issues
+	cp "${FILESDIR}"/newlib-implicits.patch stubdom || die
+
+	# Patch stubdom/Makefile to patch insource newlib & prevent internal downloading
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${P/-pvgrub/}-externals.patch
+
+	# Drop .config and Fix gcc-4.6
+	epatch 	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
+
+	# fix jobserver in Makefile
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.2.0-jserver.patch
+
+	#Sec patch
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-CVE-2012-6075-XSA-41.patch \
+                "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-0215-XSA-38.patch \
+                "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1919-XSA-46.patch \
+                "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch \
+                "${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA_49.patch
+
+	#Substitute for internal downloading. pciutils copied only due to the only .bz2
+	cp $DISTDIR/pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2 ./stubdom/ || die "pciutils not copied to stubdom"
+	retar-externals || die "re-tar procedure failed"
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+	use custom-cflags || unset CFLAGS
+	if test-flag-CC -fno-strict-overflow; then
+		append-flags -fno-strict-overflow
+	fi
+
+	emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" -C tools/include
+
+	if use x86; then
+		emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" \
+		XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" -C stubdom pv-grub
+	elif use amd64; then
+		emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" \
+		XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64" -C stubdom pv-grub
+		if use multilib; then
+			multilib_toolchain_setup x86
+			emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" \
+			XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" -C stubdom pv-grub
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	if use x86; then
+		emake XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" DESTDIR="${D}" -C stubdom install-grub
+	fi
+	if use amd64; then
+		emake XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64" DESTDIR="${D}" -C stubdom install-grub
+		if use multilib; then
+			emake XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" DESTDIR="${D}" -C stubdom install-grub
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
+	elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
+	elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
+}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.2.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.2.ebuild
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3528a602e080
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.2.ebuild
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+# Copyright 1999-2013 Gentoo Foundation
+# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen-pvgrub/xen-pvgrub-4.2.2.ebuild,v 1.1 2013/05/20 14:15:45 idella4 Exp $
+
+EAPI=4
+PYTHON_DEPEND="2:2.6"
+
+inherit flag-o-matic eutils multilib python toolchain-funcs
+
+XEN_EXTFILES_URL="http://xenbits.xensource.com/xen-extfiles"
+LIBPCI_URL=ftp://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/pub/linux/pci
+GRUB_URL=mirror://gnu-alpha/grub
+SRC_URI="
+		http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
+		$GRUB_URL/grub-0.97.tar.gz
+		$XEN_EXTFILES_URL/zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
+		$LIBPCI_URL/pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2
+		$XEN_EXTFILES_URL/lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
+		$XEN_EXTFILES_URL/newlib/newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz"
+
+S="${WORKDIR}/xen-${PV}"
+
+DESCRIPTION="allows to boot Xen domU kernels from a menu.lst laying inside guest filesystem"
+HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
+LICENSE="GPL-2"
+SLOT="0"
+KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
+IUSE="custom-cflags"
+
+DEPEND="sys-devel/gettext"
+
+RDEPEND=">=app-emulation/xen-4.2.1"
+
+pkg_setup() {
+	python_set_active_version 2
+	python_pkg_setup
+}
+
+retar-externals() {
+	# Purely to unclutter src_prepare
+	local set="grub-0.97.tar.gz lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz"
+
+	# epatch can't patch in $WORKDIR, requires a sed; Bug #455194. Patchable, but sed informative
+	sed -e s':AR=${AR-"ar rc"}:AR=${AR-"ar"}:' \
+		-i "${WORKDIR}"/zlib-1.2.3/configure
+	sed -e 's:^AR=ar rc:AR=ar:' \
+		-e s':$(AR) $@:$(AR) rc $@:' \
+		-i "${WORKDIR}"/zlib-1.2.3/{Makefile,Makefile.in}
+	einfo "zlib Makefile edited"
+
+	cd "${WORKDIR}"
+	tar czp zlib-1.2.3 -f zlib-1.2.3.tar.gz
+	tar czp grub-0.97 -f grub-0.97.tar.gz
+	tar czp lwip -f lwip-1.3.0.tar.gz
+	tar czp newlib-1.16.0 -f newlib-1.16.0.tar.gz
+	mv $set "${S}"/stubdom/
+	einfo "tarballs moved to source"
+}
+
+src_prepare() {
+	# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
+	if use custom-cflags; then
+		einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
+		# try and remove all the default custom-cflags
+		find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
+			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
+			-i {} \;
+	fi
+
+	# Patch the unmergeable newlib, fix most of the leftover gcc QA issues
+	cp "${FILESDIR}"/newlib-implicits.patch stubdom || die
+
+	# Patch stubdom/Makefile to patch insource newlib & prevent internal downloading
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.2.1-externals.patch
+
+	# Drop .config and Fix gcc-4.6
+	epatch 	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
+
+	# fix jobserver in Makefile
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.2.0-jserver.patch
+
+	#Sec patch
+	epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-CVE-2012-6075-XSA-41.patch \
+		"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1922-XSA-48.patch \
+		"${FILESDIR}"/xen-4-CVE-2013-1952-XSA-49.patch
+
+	#Substitute for internal downloading. pciutils copied only due to the only .bz2
+	cp $DISTDIR/pciutils-2.2.9.tar.bz2 ./stubdom/ || die "pciutils not copied to stubdom"
+	retar-externals || die "re-tar procedure failed"
+}
+
+src_compile() {
+	use custom-cflags || unset CFLAGS
+	if test-flag-CC -fno-strict-overflow; then
+		append-flags -fno-strict-overflow
+	fi
+
+	emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" -C tools/include
+
+	if use x86; then
+		emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" \
+		XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" -C stubdom pv-grub
+	elif use amd64; then
+		emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" \
+		XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64" -C stubdom pv-grub
+		if use multilib; then
+			multilib_toolchain_setup x86
+			emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" AR="$(tc-getAR)" \
+			XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" -C stubdom pv-grub
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+src_install() {
+	if use x86; then
+		emake XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" DESTDIR="${D}" -C stubdom install-grub
+	fi
+	if use amd64; then
+		emake XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64" DESTDIR="${D}" -C stubdom install-grub
+		if use multilib; then
+			emake XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32" DESTDIR="${D}" -C stubdom install-grub
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+pkg_postinst() {
+	elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
+	elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
+	elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
+}