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author | Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> | 2019-06-10 17:56:20 +0200 |
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committer | Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org> | 2019-06-10 17:56:20 +0200 |
commit | dedd8451ef7110167d0c7ed575a29229bd5daa68 (patch) | |
tree | b9f0f87de012e8ac96d1874037ed60e6c3c199fc /glep-0057.rst | |
parent | glep-0079: Mark as Final. (diff) | |
download | glep-dedd8451ef7110167d0c7ed575a29229bd5daa68.tar.gz glep-dedd8451ef7110167d0c7ed575a29229bd5daa68.tar.bz2 glep-dedd8451ef7110167d0c7ed575a29229bd5daa68.zip |
glep-{0057,0058,0059,0060}: Fix syntax of cross references.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'glep-0057.rst')
-rw-r--r-- | glep-0057.rst | 10 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/glep-0057.rst b/glep-0057.rst index ef7112b..588e42b 100644 --- a/glep-0057.rst +++ b/glep-0057.rst @@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ security needs to be implemented: - Tree and distfile distribution from Infrastructure to Users, via the mirrors (this includes both HTTP and rsync distribution). -Both processes need their security improved. In [GLEPxx2] we will discuss +Both processes need their security improved. In [GLEPxx2]_ we will discuss how to improve the security of the first process. The relatively speaking simpler process of file distribution will be described in -[GLEP58]. Since it can be implemented without having to change the +[GLEP58]_. Since it can be implemented without having to change the workflow and behaviour of developers we hope to get it done in a reasonably short timeframe. @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ protection against this class of attacks is very easy to implement with little added cost. At the level of mirrors, addition of malicious content is not the only -attack. As discussed by Cappos et al [C08a,C08b], an attacker may use +attack. As discussed by Cappos et al [C08a]_, [C08b]_, an attacker may use exclusion and replay attacks, possibly only on a specific subset of user to extend the window of opportunity on another exploit. @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ modifications to our development process), as a malicious developer is fully authorized to provide materials for distribution. Partial protection can be gained by Portage and Infrastructure changes, but the real improvements needed are developer education and continued -vigilance. This is further discussed in [GLEPxx2]. +vigilance. This is further discussed in [GLEPxx2]_. This security is still limited in scope - protection against compromised developers is very expensive, and even complex systems like peer review @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ cannot be complete (as the User may be attacked directly), we can ensure that Gentoo infrastructure and the mirrors are not a weak point. This objective is actually much closer than it seems already - most of the work has been completed for other things! This is further discussed in -[GLEP58]. As this process has the most to gain in security, and the +[GLEP58]_. As this process has the most to gain in security, and the most immediate impact, it should be implemented before or at the same time as any changes to process #1. Security at this layer is already available in the signed daily snapshots, but we can extend it to cover |