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authorUlrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>2019-06-10 17:56:20 +0200
committerUlrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>2019-06-10 17:56:20 +0200
commitdedd8451ef7110167d0c7ed575a29229bd5daa68 (patch)
treeb9f0f87de012e8ac96d1874037ed60e6c3c199fc /glep-0057.rst
parentglep-0079: Mark as Final. (diff)
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glep-{0057,0058,0059,0060}: Fix syntax of cross references.
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Müller <ulm@gentoo.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'glep-0057.rst')
-rw-r--r--glep-0057.rst10
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/glep-0057.rst b/glep-0057.rst
index ef7112b..588e42b 100644
--- a/glep-0057.rst
+++ b/glep-0057.rst
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ security needs to be implemented:
- Tree and distfile distribution from Infrastructure to Users, via the
mirrors (this includes both HTTP and rsync distribution).
-Both processes need their security improved. In [GLEPxx2] we will discuss
+Both processes need their security improved. In [GLEPxx2]_ we will discuss
how to improve the security of the first process. The relatively
speaking simpler process of file distribution will be described in
-[GLEP58]. Since it can be implemented without having to change the
+[GLEP58]_. Since it can be implemented without having to change the
workflow and behaviour of developers we hope to get it done in a
reasonably short timeframe.
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ protection against this class of attacks is very easy to implement with
little added cost.
At the level of mirrors, addition of malicious content is not the only
-attack. As discussed by Cappos et al [C08a,C08b], an attacker may use
+attack. As discussed by Cappos et al [C08a]_, [C08b]_, an attacker may use
exclusion and replay attacks, possibly only on a specific subset of
user to extend the window of opportunity on another exploit.
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ modifications to our development process), as a malicious developer is
fully authorized to provide materials for distribution. Partial
protection can be gained by Portage and Infrastructure changes, but the
real improvements needed are developer education and continued
-vigilance. This is further discussed in [GLEPxx2].
+vigilance. This is further discussed in [GLEPxx2]_.
This security is still limited in scope - protection against compromised
developers is very expensive, and even complex systems like peer review
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ cannot be complete (as the User may be attacked directly), we can ensure
that Gentoo infrastructure and the mirrors are not a weak point. This
objective is actually much closer than it seems already - most of the
work has been completed for other things! This is further discussed in
-[GLEP58]. As this process has the most to gain in security, and the
+[GLEP58]_. As this process has the most to gain in security, and the
most immediate impact, it should be implemented before or at the same
time as any changes to process #1. Security at this layer is already
available in the signed daily snapshots, but we can extend it to cover